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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECI-
SIONS-REQUIREMENT OF HYBRID PROCEDURES IN INFORMAL RULE-
MAKING-Union Oil Co. v. FPC, 542 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976).
In Union Oil Co. v. FPC' the Ninth Circuit provided bite to the
"substantial evidence" test used to review the factual premises upon
which an administrative agency's decision is based. A rule and order
of the Federal Power Commission (FPC or Commission) were set
aside because the evidence in the record compiled in the rulemaking
procedures was judged inadequate. This decision portends increas-
ing scrutiny of the factual basis of an agency's decisions under informal
rulemaking. Furthermore, the court's demand for a complete record
may require utilization of more elaborate rulemaking procedures.
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
On April 15, 1974, the FPC issued a "Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing,"2 stating that the Commission proposed to amend its General Rules
by creating a requirement that every natural gas company submit data
annually on a new form, Form 40, relating to the company's natural
gas reserves. 3 In accordance with the requirements of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA)4 for informal rulemaking,5 the FPC ac-
cepted written comments from over sixty natural gas producers. These
companies objected to the new rule on the grounds that it would place
a severe economic burden upon them to gather and submit this data,
it was duplicative because the necessary information could be obtained
from other agencies, and because the Commission had no regulatory
need for the data.6 At the request of the natural gas producers, the
FPC held an oral hearing attended by representatives of the industry,
1. 542 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976).
2. Id. at 1037, citing 39 Fed. Reg. 14233 (1974).
3. 542 F.2d at 1037. The Commission's new rule requiring the filing of a new Form
40 consists of three schedules containing natural gas reserve data on three bases:
(a) Schedule A--estimates of proven reserves for the reporting company;
(b) Schedule B-estimates of proven reserves on a "by field and by reservoir"
basis; and
(c) Schedule C--estimates of annual changes in proven reserves.Id.
4. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as
APA].
5. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (Supp. IV, 1974); see text accompanying notes 22-25 infra.
6. 542 F.2d at 1037, 1042.
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where they once again strenuously objected to the proposed rule.'
Following the oral hearing, the Commission, by a vote of 3-2, issued
Order Number 526, thereby adopting the rule. After negotiations with
the General Accounting Office (GAO),s the FPC eliminated some of
the features to which the GAO objected and issued Order Number 526-
A, which made the rule effective. 9 The Commission denied a rehear-
ing and the gas producers filed numerous petitions for review, which
were consolidated in this action.
The record on appeal consisted of the gas producers' written com-
ments, a transcript of the oral hearing, and written statements of the
majority and dissent of the Commission.'0 The majority of the Com-
mission gave cursory attention to the various factual contentions of the
companies concerning the burden the rule would place upon them and
the duplication of efforts involved in collecting the data. The majority
felt that: (1) because the same information was submitted to the Internal
Revenue Service under the tax regulations, it was available and not a
burden to collect; (2) it was the function of the GAO, not the FPC to
consider the economic burden; (3) the producers had not shown that
any information possessed by the other agencies would satisfy the data
requirements of the FPC; and (4) the information was needed to con-
duct company audits to determine interstate rates. 1
The gas companies sought review of the orders on the ground, inter
alia, that the Commission's adoption of Form 40 was "arbitrary and ca-
pricious."2 The court held that the factual premises upon which the
orders rested were not supported by "substantial evidence" and there-
fore failed to satisfy the standard of review 3 embodied in the Natural
7. Id.
8. 44 U.S.C. § 3512 (Supp. IV, 1974) requires the Comptroller General to review the
collection of information by independent regulatory agencies to assure that this collection
imposes only a minimum burden upon business and does not result in a duplication of
effort.
9. 542 F.2d at 1038.
10. Id. at 1037.
11. Id. at 1037-38.
12. It is important to note that the difference between the two standards, "arbitrary
and capricious" and "substantial evidence," is confined to a judicial review of factual
determination. Informal rulemaking is a mechanism for determining agency policy and
is reviewed solely under the arbitrary and capricious standard. The substantial evidence
standard, which is applied in adjudications, formal rulemaking, and the Natural Gas Act
among other statutes, merely examines whether the factual conclusions upon which the
agency bases its policy choice are supported by substantial evidence. Note, Judicial Re-
view of the Facts in Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed Standard, 84 YALE L.J. 1750,
1751 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Review].
13. 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970). The pertinent section of the statute reads: "The
1976]
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Gas Act (NGA).14  The orders adopting and implementing the rule
were set aside and the cases remanded to the FPC for further proceed-
ings.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND INFORMAL RULEMAKING
An administrative agency's task of regulating may be undertaken by
either rulemaking or adjudication. Adjudication is a quasi-judicial pro-
cedure because of its similarities with a typical courtroom trial.1
When engaged in adjudication, the agency is required to follow the
trial-type procedures of sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA. These
sections provide for an evidentiary hearing, 0 in which witnesses may
be called and extensively cross-examined, 17 and they provide for an
"exclusive record" to be compiled.' 8
An agency may also proceed by formal or informal rulemaking.
With a few exceptions,' 9 formal rulemaking is procedurally similar to
adjudication. 20 Like adjudication, cross-examination and compilation
of a record are required. Formal rulemaking is triggered when the
substantive statute requires a "hearing on the record." 2'
In contrast to adjudication and formal rulemaking, minimal statutory
requirements exist for informal rulemaking. Commonly labeled as a
"notice and comment" procedure, informal rulemaking is guided by sec-
tion 553 of the APA, which requires that the "terms of substance of the
proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved" be
finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall
be conclusive." Id.
14. Id. § 717 et seq.
15. See 1 K. DAvis, ADMINiSsrmTAV LAW TRFATISE § 5.01 (1958).
16. 5 U.S.C. H9 554(b)-(d), 556(d) (1970).
17. Id. § 556(d).
18. Id. § 556(e).
19. Formal rulemaking and adjudication differ in two ways. First, ex parte communi-
cation with the agency official conducting the hearing is prohibited in adjudication but
not in formal rulemaking. Id. § 554(d) (2) (B). Second, unlike adjudication, the agency
may omit the initial decision by the presiding official in formal rulemaking if necessary.
Id. § 557(b) (2).
20. Like adjudication, formal rulemaking proceeds according to the requirements of
sections 556 and 557 of the APA. Id. § 553(c) (Supp. IV, 1974). These sections pro-
vide for a formal hearing under oath; witnesses called and -cross-examined; depositions, if
necessary; and an exclusive record containing the ruling on each "finding, conclusion, or
exception presented." Id. H§ 556(c)-(e), 557(c) (1970).
21. In United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972), the Court
held that the formal procedures of sections 556 and 557 of the APA must be followed
only when the authorizing statute requires a "hearing on the record." This test was re-
iterated in United States v. Florida Eait Coast Ry.,'410 U.S. 224 .(1973).
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published in the Federal Register22 so as to provide advance notice to
interested parties, who may then submit oral or written comments.
2 3
When finally issued, the rules are published 4 and must include a "con-
cise general statement of their basis and purpose."'28 The record com-
piled during informal rulemaking procedures generally consists of the
notice in the Federal Register, any comments submitted to the agency
and other data collected by the agency, as well as the opinion of the
members of the rulemaking Commission.
26
Informal rulemaking provides an agency with the advantages of effi-
ciency, flexibility, and broad participation in developing administrative
policies. 7 As a result, many agencies have turned to rulemaking rather
than adjudication to perform their regulatory functions. This trend has
found encouragement in a number of cases approving rulemaking pro-
cedures.28
The courts have had numerous occasions in recent years to decide
whether the FPC could use informal rulemaking in ratemaking.29 In
Union Oil, the FPC sought to gather data which, it was argued, would
assist them in determining policy and setting rates. A number of sec-
tions of the NGA ° were posited as sources of authority for the rule
22. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
23. Id. § 553(c). The language of the statute reads:
After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data,
views, [or] [sic] arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.
Id.
24. Id. § 553(d) (1970).
25. Id. § 553(c) (Supp. IV, 1974).
26. Id. See also Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv.
185, 205 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Verkuil]; Judicial Review, supra note 12, at 1758
n.41.
27. See Verkuil, supra note 26, at 187; Judicial Review, supra note 12, at 1752; Note,
The Judicial Role in Defining Procedural Requirements for Agency Rulemaking, 87
HARv. L. REv. 782 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Role].
28. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 624-25 (1973);
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1956); SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); NLRB v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 406 F.2d 253 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012 (1969); WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d
601 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 914 (1968); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359
F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
29. In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968); FPC v. Texaco, Inc..
377 U.S. 33 (1964); Consumer Fed'n of America v. FPC, 515 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906 (1975); American Public Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d
718 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Municipal Intervenors Group v. FPC, 473 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359 F.2d 318 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 847 (1966).
30. 15 U.S.C. 8H 717g, 717i, 717m, 717o (1970).
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which created Form 40, and the court recognized that the FPC has
broad authority "to obtain information and to require reports."'31 How-
ever, the proffered sections lent no assistance in determining whether
formal or informal rulemaking was proper.32 The court concluded that
the full panoply of formal adjudicatory-type procedures was inappropri-
ate,s3 and "[blecause the Natural Gas Act does not require a trial type
hearing for rulemaking, the Administrative Procedure Act does not."3"
What this latter phrase evidently means is that the NGA does not man-
date a "hearing on the record," which is the touchstone phrase that trig-
gers formal rulemaking under the APA.35
IMl. REVIEWING STANDARDS AND THE ROLE OF A RECORD
The APA provides two alternative standards which serve as a basis
for judicial review of agency determinations of fact: the "arbitrary and
capricious" and "substantial evidence" tests. 6 Which test will be used
depends on the type of agency proceeding and the accompanying stand-
ard established by the APA. In addition, any special standard of re-
view may be supplied by the particular regulatory act. Unless the sub-
stantive statute provides otherwise, the arbitrary and capricious test
is generally used to review the factual basis of informal rulemaking;
37
31. 542 F.2d at 1039 (footnote omitted).
32. Although the Natural Gas Act provides that "[tihe Commission shall have the
power . . . to prescribe, issue, make, amend, and rescind such orders, rules, and regula-
tions as it may find necessary or appropriate .... " (15 U.S.C. § 717o (1970)), it does
not prescribe the specific procedure to be used in any given circumstances, The APA,
on the other hand, defines the terms "rule," "rule making," "order," and "adjudication,"
and describes when each is to be used by an agency. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4)-(7) (1970),
as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4)-(7) (Supp. IV, 1974).
33. 542 F.2d at 1039-40.
34. Id.
35. See note 21 supra.
36. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1970). The pertinent sections of the statute read as follows:
The reviewing court shall-
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance
with the law.
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557
of this title [adjudications] or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hear-
ing provided by statute ....
Id.
37. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp, v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 667-70 (6th
Cir. 1972); Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v. FPC, 421 F.2d 17, 23 (6th Cir. 1970); Cali-
fornia Citizen's Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 844 (1967). See also Verkuil, supra note 26, at 185, 205-06; Judicial Review, supra
note 12, at 1750, 1751.
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the substantial evidence test typically serves as the standard for ad-
judication and formal rulemaking.
38
The NGA, however, expressly provides that the "finding of the
[Federal Power] Commission as to the facts, if supported by substan-
tial evidence, shall be conclusive."39 In Union Oil, then, the court was
applying to informal rulemaking a test normally reserved for adjudica-
tion and formal rulemaking.40
The courts have experienced confusion in such a situation largely be-
cause of the conflict between the type of record produced by an in-
formal rulemaking procedure and the scrutiny required by a substan-
tial evidence standard of review.4' The less elaborate procedures of
informal rulemaking are well-suited to concise and efficient regulating
of an industry. However, the procedures that permit an agency to pro-
ceed with celerity and flexibility also limit that agency's ability to make a
complete record.
In adjudication and formal rulemaking, cross-examination of wit-
nesses and the requirement that the agency decision must be based on
the record compiled at the hearing4" affords reviewing courts a com-
plete record. These formal records facilitate judicial review by allow-
ing the courts to judge whether the agency's decision is adequately sup-
ported by the evidence before it. But the less formal procedures of
informal rulemaking do not encompass confrontation and cross-exam-
38. See National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 (2nd Cir.
1975); DiVosta Rentals, Inc. v. Lee, 488 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 984 (1974). See also Verkuil, supra note 26, at 205-06.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
40. The problem faced by the court is epitomized in one sentence:
Thus we are reviewing, under authority of the Natural Gas Act, an order adopting
and effectuating a rule or regulation as authorized under that Act, in a proceeding
prescribed under the Administrative Procedure Act, but under a standard embodied
in the Natural Gas Act.
542 F.2d at 1040.
The cause of this problem is the interplay between the APA and the enabling statutes
of the various administrative agencies. The implication of section 706(2) (E) of the
APA is that the standard to be applied to informal rule-making is the arbitrary and ca-
pricious test since the substantial evidence test is only made applicable to adjudications
and formal rulemaking. The confusion arises when Congress takes the substantial evi-
dence language from section 706(2)(E) and places it in a statute such as the Natural
Gas Act to be the standard for all proceedings under that Act.
41. Union Oil Co. v. FPC, 542 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC,
483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Papercraft Corp. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 927 (7th Cir.
1973); Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972); Chicago
v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (1970). See Northern Cal. Power Agency v. Morton, 396 F.
Supp. 1187 (D.D.C. 1975).
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ination, which are usually required by reviewing courts as a basis for
fact-finding. Moreover, the substantial evidence standard of review
has come to mean a rigorous and searching inquiry into agency action.4
Thus, the courts reviewing agency actions under the NGA may be
faced with the difficult task of making a careful examination of an in-
complete and unfocused record.
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In Union Oil, the court first interpreted the "substantial evidence"
language in the NGA to require a greater degree of judicial scrutiny.
Secondly, the court reasoned that this stricter standard could only be sat-
isfied by a record which provides sufficient evidence to support the ac-
tion taken by the agency. Finally, the court examined the record and
concluded that it did not contain any evidence to sustain the factual
premises upon which the Commission had based its decision.
A. The Substantial Evidence Test Requires Greater Scrutiny
In stating that "Congress expected greater scrutiny when the en-
abling statute contains a substantial evidence test,"4 4 the Union Oil court
relied on neither legislative history nor judicial interpretation to deter-
mine what Congress intended by including the substantial evidence
test in the NGA. It merely rejected the conclusion of some courts4"
that the differences between arbitrary and capricious and substantial
evidence standards in the context of reviewing informal rulemaking
were minimal.46 The Ninth Circuit objected to the suggestion of these
courts that little or no evidence is necessary to support an agency's fac-
tual determination under either standard of review.
B. The Substantial Evidence Test Requires a More Extensive Record
Although the creation and implementation of Form 40 fulfilled all
requirements for informal rulemaking,47 the court felt that the cumula-
tive record was inadequate.
We tend to consider such less formal records as somehow suspect, be-
cause the evidence has not been presented under adversary type pro-
43. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 143 (1967); Verkuil, supra
note 26, at 214.
44. 542 F.2d at 1041.
45. See Associated Indus., Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 347-50 (2d
Cir. 1973); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1146 (1974).
46. 542 F.2d at 1040-41.
47. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
[Vol. 10
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ceedings, and so has not received the rigorous testing by confrontation
and cross-examination that we usually demand as a basis for fact-
finding.... Such records tend to make courts nervous, even though the
proceeding does comply with § 553.
48
Still, the court did not want to eliminate the "time and cost saving
advantages" of informal rulemaking. Thus, it sought to fashion a flex-
ible, middle ground. The court concluded that the record need not
be as complete as that compiled in adjudication, but "must contain suf-
ficient factual data, however informally presented, to provide substan-
tial evidentiary support for the action taken."49
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence Test
In light of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the substantial evi-
dence standard of review, the FPC's superficial treatment of the gas
producers' claims was clearly inadequate. The record presented to the
court contained little evidence to support the factual premises underly-
ing the Commission's decision. It was not surprising, therefore, that
the Union Oil court found the agency's conclusion to be unsupported
by substantial evidence.
In reply to the gas companies' first objection, that Form 40 would
impose a severe economic burden, the FPC asserted that the natural
gas industry was already required to furnish the same information to
the Internal Revenue Service. Thus, it would impose no burden on
the companies to supply the data to the FPC as well. The court re-
jected this contention as inaccurate on the grounds that the tax regula-
tions required the companies to submit data based upon "ownership,
lease, or working interests, not on a reservoir basis as the Commission
requires in Form 40. . . ."I' This claim was the sole support offered
by the Commission. When rejected by the court, it became clear that
the Commission had failed to support the factual premise with sub-
stantial evidence.
The gas companies' second objection to Form 40 was that it was du-
plicative and the needs of the FPC could be amply satisfied by data
supplied on a more commonly recorded basis than the reserVoir basis.
The Commission answered with the terse statement that information
provided on this basis was unreliable. Once again, the Union Oil court
rebuked the FPC for failing to furnish any evidence to support its con-
clusion. Even if valid grounds existed for such a conclusion, as the
48. 542 F.2d at 1040 (footnote omitted).
49. Id. at 1041.
50. Id. at 1042 (emphasis added).
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court suggests, it reasoned that the agency, not a reviewing court, must
support an agency's findings.51
The last objection raised by the gas producers was that all of the in-
formation sought by the FPC was available from other federal agencies.
The Commission's reply to this challenge was that this data was confi-
dential" and could not be obtained from other agencies. The court
chided the Commission for taking such a stand. Indeed, the FPC's
position was somewhat absurd in view of the Commission's plans to
make Form 40 information available for public inspection. In addi-
tion, as the court pointed out, those parties whose confidential interests
the FPC sought to protect were the same parties seeking disclosure of
the data. Thus, the Union Oil court concluded, not only did the Com-
mission's support fall short of the substantial evidence test, it ignored
the directive of Congress in the NGA that the FPC utilize the resources
of other agencies in performing its regulatory function.53
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNION OIL DECISION
A. Interpretation of the "Substantial Evidence" Standard of Review
In Union Oil, the Ninth Circuit sought to achieve a compromise be-
51. Id. at 1043, citing Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 539
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
52. The natural gas producers appealed the FPC's decision to place the data in
schedules B and C submitted by the companies on public record. See note 3 supra.
The FPC had intended to put schedule A data on public file. Schedule B and C data
would remain confidential unless the FPC otherwise ordered.
Trade secrets are exempt from the mandatory disclosure provisions of the Freedom
of Information Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (1970). The Ninth Circuit panel held
that the data required by Form 40 constituted a trade secret and, as such, had to
remain confidential under the exemption provision. 542 F.2d at 1045. Subsequently,
however, the court withdrew its holding as "premature" and left open the issue of
whether the producers had a right, enforceable against the FPC, to prevent disclosure
of information. Id.
The court also held that the FPC's rule which makes such information a matter of
public record failed to meet the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (1970); see note 12 supra. It reasoned that a rule which gave the
Commission "unfettered discretion" to make the data available, without any procedures
to consider the likely harm to the producers, was without a rational basis. 542 F.2d at
1045, 1046.
53. 542 F.2d at 1043-44. In section 11(c) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §
717j(c) (1970), Congress ordered:
In carrying out the purposes of this chapter, the Commission shall, so far as
practicable, avail itself of the services, records, reports, and information of the
executive departments and other agencies of the Government[,] and the President
may, from time to time, direct that such services and facilities be made available
to the Commission.
Id.
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tween the advantages of informal rulemaking and the rigorous judicial
review the court concluded was expected under the substantial evi-
dence test. The compromise reached by the court was to require a
more complete record than that normally produced by informal rule-
making procedures. However, the end result of the Union Oil court's
compromise may be the introduction of the "hybrid procedures" ad-
vocated by the District of Columbia Circuit in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC."4
These hybrid procedures incorporate some, but not all, of the features
of a trial-type hearing normally reserved for adjudication and formal
rulemaking.
The underpinning of the Ninth Circuit's result is its conclusion that
the substantial evidence test mandates a more rigorous judicial re-
view than the arbitrary and capricious test. This is by no means a
foregone conclusion. As the court indicated, there was authority to the
contrary. In Associated Industries v. Department of Labor,55 Judge
Friendly of the Second Circuit stated that the two standards "tend to
converge" when courts review informal rulemaking on a "notice and
comment" record.5 6 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit itself, in reviewing
FPC rulemaking, had earlier stated:
[I]n determining the propriety of rules of general application, only a
legal question is presented-whether on the factual premise upon which
the Commission acted, the rule promulgated is unreasonable ... arbi-
trary, capricious or discriminatory. If the factual premise itself were
open to review, then it would be necessary . . . for all general rule-
making to include a trial-like hearing.57
The court held that insofar as the Commission had a "reasonable basis"
for promulgating its rule, it was not subject to attack on review." This
reasonable basis test applied by the court in Superior Oil Co. v. FPC59
differs little from the arbitrary and capricious test normally reserved
for review of the factual premises of informal rulemaking.
Another case which reaches an opposite conclusion as to the amount
of judicial scrutiny required by the substantial evidence test is Phil-
54. 483 F.2d 1238, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
55. 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973).
56. Id. at 350.
57. Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 619 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 922 (1964). See also Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. FPC, 387 F.2d 619 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 909 (1967).
58. Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 619 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 922 (1964).
59. Sabin v. Butz, 515 F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1975); Carlisle Paper Box Co. v. NLRB,
398 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1968); AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 390 F. Supp. 972 (D.D.C. 1975).
1976]
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lips Petroleum Corp. v. FPC0 wherein the Tenth Circuit gave a nar-
row reading to the substantial evidence test. In Phillips, the court
concluded that the FPC had been granted broad discretion in formulat-
ing rules6' and rejected a contention that this discretion was limited by
the "need for -an adequate record on review.""2
This view that the substantial evidence test is no more demanding
than the arbitrary and capricious test in the context of informal rule-
making has been rejected by other authorities. Notably, in Mobil Oil, the
District of Columbia Circuit explicitly rejected the narrow reading given
the substantial evidence test by the court in Phillips."' The Mobil Oil
court concluded that the substantial evidence test "imposes a consider-
able burden on the agency and limits its discretion in arriving at a factual
predicate.""4  This position is supported by Supreme Court cases""
and commentators, 66 who have concluded that a substantial evidence
test connotes active judicial review while the arbitrary and capricious
standard implies a "soft" or "cursory" judicial review.
In Union Oil, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Mobil Oil view of the
significance of the substantial evidence test in the Natural Gas Act.
The Union Oil court simply stated: "We think, however, that Congress
expected greater scrutiny when the enabling statute contains a sub-
stantial evidence test."0 7 The court reached this result in a conclusory
fashion, relying on neither legislative history nor judicial interpretation.
This failure on the part of the Union Oil court to support its proposition
with any authority reinforces the conclusion that the Ninth Circuit is
in agreement with the Mobil Oil court's reading of the substantial evi-
dence test. The Mobil Oil court also failed to support its conclusion with
authority. Moreover, both the Mobil Oil and Union Oil courts drew the
conclusion from their interpretation of the substantial evidence test that
60. 475 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1973).
61. Id. at 852.
62. Id. at 850.
63. 483 F.2d at 1262.
64. Id. at 1258 (footnote omitted).
65. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 143 (1967); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 481 (1951).
66. Verkuil, supra note 26, at 185, 214; Judicial Review, supra note 12, at 1750, 1752.
See also Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Re-
view, 59 CONmELL L. REv. 375, 391 (1974). "'Arbitrary and capricious' review thus
came- to be considered 'soft' or cursory, while substantial evidence implied more search-
ing review of agency action." Judicial Review, supra note 12, at 1752.
67. 542 F.2d at 1041.
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something more is required of the agency than mere informal rule-
making.
Despite the failure of both Mobil Oil and Union Oil to support their
initial premise, there is authority to justify this position. As noted above,
it has generally been recognized that the substantial evidence stand-
ard of judicial review is more demanding than the arbitrary and capri-
cious test. The APA itself provides for both of these standards of review.
Unless the use of "substantial evidence" merely reflects a choice of lan-
guage on the part of Congress, clearly there was intended a difference
between the types of review. Two Supreme Court cases reflect that
difference. In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 6 8 the Supreme Court
interpreted the substantial evidence test as requiring that the review-
ing court examine the "whole record" of the agency proceedings, not
just that evidence favorable to the agency's decision.69 Thus the test
was construed to require greater support for the agency action than a
mere rational basis required under the arbitrary and capricious test.
In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,70 Justice Harlan, in discussing judi-
cial review of an anti-injunction act, defined the difference between
the two tests. He noted that the substantial evidence test provides
for "a considerably more generous judicial review than the 'arbitrary
and capricious' test. .... "71 In view of these arguments, it would ap-
pear that the position of the Union Oil and Mobil Oil courts is logically
consistent and better supported.
B. Limitations on Procedure and Record
In Mobil Oil, the District of Columbia Circuit reasoned that the
substantial evidence test and the degree of evidentiary support required
to buttress an agency's decision determined the type of procedures the
agency is required to follow in promulgating rules.72  In short, the
substantial evidence test acted as a limitation upon informal rulemak-
ing procedures. The Mobil Oil court required "some sort of adver-
sary, adjudicative-type procedures . . . ,73 Although they need not
rise to the level of adjudication, cross-examination of witnesses, or some
other method of interrogation, must be utilized. Only through such
68. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
69. Judicial Review, supra note 12, at 1751.
70. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
71. Id. at 143.
72. 483 F.2d at 1258-59.
73. Id. at 1259.
1976]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
procedures would a court be provided with a complete record for ef-
fective review.
On its face, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Union Oil does not reach
the same result. The court does not specifically direct itself to the type
of procedures that are required by its stricter reading of the substantial
evidence test. Its result is framed in terms of the type of record re-
quired to meet this rigorous standard of review. As the court puts it,
the reviewing court must be provided "with a record upon which it can
determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial ev-
idence. ' 7 4  Thus, the court held that while the type of record required
need not be the thorough record compiled by formal rulemaking and
adjudication, the mere "notice and comment" record of informal rule-
making was not sufficient.
7 5
Although the Union Oil court conceded that the District of Columbia
Circuit had adopted a "similar approach" in Mobil Oil,70 the court was
careful to point out that it did not require "an adjudicative hearing, or,
for that matter, any oral hearing. ' 77 Arguably, however, the Ninth Cir-
cuit did arrive at the same result as Mobil Oil but took a different route.
In speaking of the need for a more complete record, the Ninth Circuit
indicated that the additional procedures required by the District of
Columbia Circuit may be necessary to satisfy the record requirement im-
posed on the FPC. The Union Oil court noted that "[d]ifferent issues
may lend themselves to varying types of procedures. 78  It cited the
Mobil Oil court to the effect that "the Commission should 'realistically
tailor the proceedings to fit the issues before it.' "79 The court seemed
to acknowledge that while its holding spoke in terms of the record re-
quired, the substance and effect of its decision went to the type of pro-
cedures necessary to compile a proper record for review.
A comparison of the reasoning of the Union Oil court with the
Mobil Oil court further indicates that the Ninth Circuit is using a
different approach to impose hybrid procedures. In Mobil Oil, the
court used the need for an adequate record as an additional argument
to buttress its position that more elaborate procedures are required.
74. 542 F.2d at 1041.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id., citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
citing Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074
(1972).
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In Union Oil, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the substantial evidence
test alone compelled a more complete record. In essence, the Union Oil
court has borrowed one premise of Mobil Oil and used it to impliedly
achieve the same result. The only substantial difference is that the
Union Oil court has not explicitly extended its reasoning to its furthest
point by suggesting certain procedures the FPC might take to comply
with its decision, as the court did in Mobil Oil.8 0
One further reason for suggesting that the end result of this decision
is the same as Mobil Oil is the practical considerations involved. Al-
though the Union Oil court does not specifically mandate hybrid pro-
cedures, realistically the type of record required cannot be compiled
without the use of some element of a trial-type hearing. Where the
factual premises upon which the agency bases its decision are somehow
suspect, it is difficult to see how the court will be able to determine
their validity unless they are tested by confrontation and cross-exami-
nation. Perhaps "substantial" evidence can be illuminated only by cer-
tain trial-type procedures. 8' The Union Oil court itself intimates that
the type of record required cannot be developed without some kind
of "adversary type proceedings."" 2
If the Union Oil decision does indeed impose hybrid procedures upon
informal rulemaking, the results will be harsh. The calling and cross-
examination of witnesses will deprive informal rulemaking of its time
and cost-saving advantages. Although all proceedings will not require
a full trial-type hearing, the FPC will definitely be hampered in its ef-
forts to effectively deal with the myriad of problems that arise in the
natural gas industry.
VI. CONCLUSION
The fact that the Union Oil court chose to adopt the reasoning of
the District of Columbia Circuit in Mobil Oil, rather than simply remand-
ing the case to the FPC to compile a further record as other courts have
80. Realistically, the court in Mobil Oil did not extend its reasoning to the furthest
point. One commentator has suggested that the "ultimate conclusion" of the court's
"substantial evidence argument" is "informal rulemaking." See Verkuil, supra note 26,
at 223.
81. In Mobil Oil, the court suggested a number of alternatives which might comply
with the procedures required by the substantial evidence test. Some of these were: Oral
cross-examination, "written questions and responses in the nature of interrogatories and
evidence incorporated . . . from other proceedings." 483 F.2d at 1263. The Union Oil
court, however, refused to elaborate upon the type of procedures it thought might pro-
duce the required record.
82. 542 F.2d 1040-41.
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done,"3 indicates that the Ninth Circuit will require hybrid procedures in
informal rulemaking. At a minimum, other courts will be able to rely
on the decision as precedent if they seek to require confrontation and
additional trial-type procedures when an administrative agency issues
rules. In a larger context, the case indicates that agency regulation will
be subject to greater scrutiny in the Ninth Circuit. The Union Oil court's
interpretation of the substantial evidence test is a large step away
from the maximum deference often paid to agency decisions. s4 In the
future, the Ninth Circuit will demand greater justification from adminis-
trative bodies before permitting interference with the private sector.
Thomas J. Masenga
83. Rhode Island Consumers' Council v. FPC, 504 F.2d 203, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Columbia LNG Corp. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 651, 654-55 (5th Cir. 1974); Skelley Oil Co.
v. FPC, 375 F.2d 6, 35 (10th Cir. 1967).
84. Cf. Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
922 (1964). See also Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061, 1071-72 (5th Cir. 1975);
Memphis Light, Gas & Water v. FPC, 500 F.2d 798, 800-01 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Shell
Oil Co. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 82, 85 (5th Cir. 1974); Southern La. Area Rate Cases v. FPC,
428 F.2d 407, 418 (5th Cir. 1970).
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